Coping with malware is ge ing more and more challenging, given their relentless growth in complexity and volume. One of the most common approaches in literature is using machine learning techniques, to automatically learn models and pa erns behind such complexity, and to develop technologies for keeping pace with the speed of development of novel malware. is survey aims at providing an overview on the way machine learning has been used so far in the context of malware analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the signi cant improvement of security defence mechanisms and their continuous evolution, malware are still spreading and keeping to succeed in pursuing their malicious goals. Malware analysis concerns the study of malicious samples with the aim of developing a deeper understanding about several aspects of malware, including their behaviour, how they evolve over time, and how they intrude speci c targets. e outcomes of malware analysis should allow security rms to update their defence solutions, in order to keep pace with malware evolution and consequently prevent new security incidents.
Within the unceasing arm race between malware developers and analysts, each progress of security mechanisms is likely to be promptly followed by the realization of some evasion trick. e easiness of overcoming novel defensive measures also depends on how well they capture malicious traits of samples. For example, a detection rule based on the MD5 hash of a known malware can be easily eluded by applying standard obfuscation techniques, indeed they change the binary of the malware, and thus its hash, but leave its behaviour unmodi ed. On the other side, developing detection rules that capture the semantics of a malicious sample is much more di cult to circumvent, as malware developers should apply more complex modi cations.
Given the importance of producing defensive technologies as challenging as possible to overcome for malware producers, a major goal for malware analysis should be to capture aspects and traits having the broadest scope. In this way, resulting security measures would become harder to circumvent, and consequently the e ort for a ackers to adapt existing malware would result infeasible. Machine learning is a natural choice to support such a process of knowledge extraction. e plentiful availability of samples to analyse, and thus of really large training sets, has fostered the adoption of machine learning for malware analysis. Indeed, many works in literature have taken this direction, with a variety of approaches, objectives and obtained results.
is survey aims at reviewing and systematising existing academic works where machine learning is used to support malware analysis of Windows executables, i.e., Portable Executables (PEs). 57 recent papers have been reviewed, and their approaches have been systematised according to three fundamental dimensions
• the speci c objective of the presented malware analysis (i.e., the output), • what types of features they consider (i.e., the input),
• what machine learning algorithms they consider.
Such a simple characterisation of academic works helps in understanding how machine learning can be used within the context of malware analysis, so as to also identify possible novel relevant objectives that have not been investigated yet. We distinguished 7 di erent objectives: malware detection, malware variants detection (variants selection and families selection), malware category detection, malware novelty and similarity detection, malware development detection, malware a ribution, and malware triage. e review of the features that can be gathered from a sample provides a comprehensive view of available information, and how they can be used with reference to identi ed malware analysis objectives. Smart combinations of these information can lead to extract additional knowledge to be used to achieve further objectives or re ne existing ones. We grouped the features used by surveyed papers in 15 types: strings, byte sequences, opcodes, APIs/System calls, memory accesses, le system accesses, Windows registry, CPU registers, function length, PE le characteristics, raised exceptions, network, AV/Sandbox submissions, and code stylometry.
Examining used algorithms provides an e ective overview about how selected inputs can be processed to achieve a speci c malware analysis objective. e frequent employment of a particular algorithm to achieve a given objective means that such algorithm is likely to be really e ective for that objective. On the other hand, observing that some class of algorithms has never been used for a certain objective may suggest novel directions to investigate further. We arranged algorithms in 4 classes: signature-based (malicious signature matching, malicious graph matching), classi cation (rule-based classi er, Bayes classi er, support vector machine, prototype-based classi cation, decision tree, k-Nearest neighbors, arti cial neural network), clustering (clustering with locality sensitive hashing, clustering with distance and similarity metrics, k-Means clustering, density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise, hierarchical clustering, prototype-based ACM Transactions on the Web, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: October 2017.
Survey on the Usage of Machine Learning Techniques for Malware Analysis 1:3 clustering, self-organizing maps), and others (expectation maximization, learning with local and global consistency, belief propagation). e thorough study we have carried out has highlighted some interesting points that would deserve to be dealt with in more detail, indeed we claim they can be developed to extend and improve current academic research on the usage of machine learning for malware analysis.
A rst point concerns a general lack of proper explanation about the reasons why a speci c set of features enables to properly characterise the malicious traits of samples. e common approach is to take all the available features, feed them to the chosen machine learning algorithms, and compute accuracy metrics on obtained (usually good) results. Some works include a feature selection phase where the subset of most determining features is extracted. Except for a few papers, the vast majority does not delve into explaining the connection between considered features and achieved results, which seems to leave the whole analysis rather incomplete. We advocate the need to properly address this aspect whenever machine learning algorithms are used for malware analysis.
Another point regards the set of samples used for training and testing the chosen model. Most of reviewed papers do not describe in detail the employed dataset, nor they share it publicly, which prevents others from reproducing published results, and thus from properly comparing newly proposed solutions. is is obviously a signi cant obstacle to streamlining advancements in the eld of malware analysis through machine learning. As a ma er of fact, in other research areas where reference benchmarks are available, it is easy to prove (and also to disprove) that a novel technique is be er than the state of the art, and thus to assert a progress. On the other hand, establishing a benchmark of samples acknowledged by the academic malware analysis community is extremely challenging. Indeed, benchmarks should be as stable as possible over time to be used as reference points for measurements, but malware are characterized by a strong intrinsic evolutionary nature. Novel and more advanced malicious samples are developed daily, hence each malware becomes less interesting from a research perspective as time goes by. Despite this, we believe that more e ort should be spent along the direction of enabling researchers to reproduce published results, and thus to correctly compare di erent solutions. At this regard, we outline some desired properties that a dataset of samples should have to become a valid reference for research purposes.
A nal point is about the novel concept of malware analysis economics. e nal purpose of malware analysis is expanding the knowledge on malware, by the means of a learning process continuous over time, whose e ectiveness can be measured along two dimensions. e rst is the pace of knowledge growth, which relates to how fast this knowledge develops with respect to the evolution of malware over time. e second is the accuracy of the knowledge, which refers to the extent such knowledge matches the real characteristics of malware. Both pace and accuracy depend on several factors, some being hard to assess, others being easily measurable. When machine learning comes into play, these quanti able factors include how many novel samples are considered, how many features are extracted from each sample, and what kinds of algorithms are used. Having bigger datasets at disposal (i.e., large number of samples) generally leads to learn more accurate malware knowledge, at the cost of greater e ort for the collection, feature extraction, and elaboration of a larger number of samples. Required time is likely to increase too, which impacts negatively on the pace of malware knowledge growth. To keep this time as constant as possible, more physical resources should be employed to parallelise to some extent the whole malware analysis process, which in turn entails additional costs because of the higher provisioning requested. What emerges is the existence of a trade-o between the cost of the analysis from one hand, and the growth pace and accuracy of acquired knowledge from the other. Analogous Since the costs of malware analysis could easily rise to una ordable levels in an a empt to achieve the highest accuracy and the fastest growth of malware knowledge, a careful understanding of the dynamics of such trade-o s turns out to be highly strategic. us, we claim the importance of investigating thoroughly the relationships between what is required to improve the e ectiveness of malware analysis (i.e., growth pace and accuracy of obtained malware knowledge) and how much it costs (i.e., in terms of time, realization complexity, and needed resources). is would make it possible to de ne clear guidelines on se ing up a malware analysis process able to meet speci c requirements on e ectiveness at the minimum cost.
In literature, some works have already addressed the problem of surveying contributions dealing with the usage of machine learning techniques for malware analysis. In [11] , the authors analyse scienti c papers on malware detection only. ey identify three main methods for detecting malicious so ware, based on signatures, behaviors, and machine learning techniques. Gandotra et al. [29] survey papers that use machine learning techniques for malware analysis and only distinguish between malware detection and family classi cation. In [64] , the authors focus on papers proposing techniques based on pa ern matching to recognize malware. Basu et al. examine di erent works relying on data mining and machine learning techniques, whose primary objective is the detection of possibly malicious so ware [9] . e survey outlines the types of analysis that a malware analyst can carry out and discusses di erent types of inputs that can be potentially used (e.g. byte sequences, opcodes, PE le characteristics). Compared to our work, the above mentioned surveys focus just on very few malware analysis objectives, and their studies are limited to the descriptions of proposed approaches without any a empt of structuring surveyed contributions.
At the time of writing, the most similar work to ours is the one published by LeDoux and Lakhotia [47] . eir article points out the problems related to malware analysis and how machine learning can help in solving them. Similarly to our work, they provide a wider overview on machine learning concepts, list a set of features useful for analysing malware, and state the complexity of gathering a ground truth to evaluate analysis results. However, as nal objective of malware analysis, they only consider the timely detection, removal, and recovery from the infection, while in this paper we identify 7 di erent possible objectives. e rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic notions on malware analysis. Section 3 outlines the possible objectives of malware analysis, Section 4 delves with what types of input data is used for the analysis, and Section 5 reports what machine learning methods are employed. e characterization of surveyed papers according to the inputs, outputs and algorithms described in previous sections is reported in Section 6. Section 7 describes the datasets used in each paper: it discusses sample collections and the issues related to experimental evaluation reproducibility. Malware analysis economics are investigated in Section 8. Finally, conclusions and possible future works are presented in Section 9.
BACKGROUND ON MALWARE ANALYSIS
With malware analysis, we refer to the process of studying a generic sample (i.e., a le), with the aim of acquiring knowledge about its potentially malicious nature. e analysis of a sample includes an initial phase where required data are extracted from the le, and an elaboration phase where these data are examined, and possibly correlated to some available knowledge base, to gain further added-value information. What information are mined depend on the speci c objective to achieve. In the works considered in this survey, the information extraction process is performed through either static or dynamic analysis, or a combination of both, while examination and correlation are carried out by using machine learning techniques. Approaches based on static analysis look at the content of samples without requiring their execution, while dynamic analysis works by running samples to examine their behaviour. Execution traces are indeed among the inputs used in examination and correlation phases when dynamic analysis is employed. For an extensive dissertation on dynamic analyses, refer to [22] .
Malware development strategies are in line with so ware engineering recommendations for what concerns code reuse, in the sense that any speci c malware is usually updated to the minimal extent required to evade latest detection techniques. Indeed, as a new malware is discovered by security rms and then neutralised by releasing the correspondent antivirus detection rule (e.g., its signature) or so ware patch, malware developers are likely to produce a variant of that malware, which keeps most of the code and characteristics of the original version but di ers for a few aspects to guarantee its e ectiveness in evading current recognition mechanisms. ese mechanisms are commonly evaded by employing obfuscation and encryption techniques to automatically generate variants.
ese variants are referred to as polymorphic and metamorphic malware. Polymorphism changes the appearance of the original malicious code by means of encryption and data appending/prepending. ese modi cations are performed by mutation engines, usually bundled within the malware itself. e limitation of this variant generation approach is that malware code remains the same once decrypted by a mutation engine, which makes in-memory signature-based detection methods e ective. On the other hand, metamorphic malware can still evade these recognition mechanisms thanks to more advanced morphing techniques. ese include insertion of a number of No Operation (NOP) and garbage instructions, function reordering, control ow modi cation, and variation in data structure usage. Malicious so ware exploiting metamorphism automatically recodes itself before propagating or being redistributed by the a acker. is kind of variants can be detected by focussing on the semantics of an executable.
Variants originating from a same "root" malware are usually grouped in a malware family, which by consequence includes a set of samples sharing many similarities, yet being di erent enough among each other from the point of view of anti-malware tools.
MALWARE ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES
is section details the analysis goals of the surveyed papers, organized in 7 distinct objectives.
3.1 Malware Detection e most common objective in the context of malware analysis is detecting whether a given sample is malicious. From a practical point of view, this objective is also the most important because knowing in advance that a sample is dangerous allows preventing it from being harmful for a system. Indeed, the majority of reviewed works has this as main goal [3, 4, 7, 15, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 42, 44, 66-68, 72, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81] . According to the speci c machine learning technique employed into the detection process, the output generated by the analysis can be provided with a con dence value. e higher this value, the more the output of the analysis is likely to be correct. Hence, the con dence value can be used by malware analysts to understand if a sample under analysis needs further inspection.
Malware Variants Detection
Developing variants is one of the most e ective and cheapest strategies for an a acker to evade detection mechanisms, while reusing as much as possible already available codes and resources. Recognizing that a sample is actually a variant of a known malware prevents such strategy to succeed, and paves the way to understand how malware evolve over time through the continuous development of new variants. Also this objective has been deeply studied in literature, and several papers included in this survey target the detection of variants. More speci cally, we identify two slightly di erent variations of this objective • variants selection: given a malicious sample m, select from the available knowledge base the samples that are variants of m [17, 31, 32, 40, 45, 49, 70, 75, 77] . Variants of a malicious samples can be obtained by employing metamorphism and polymorphism (see Section 2) .
Considering the huge number of malicious samples received daily from major security rms, recognizing variants of already known malware is crucial to reduce the workload for human analysts; • families selection: given a malicious sample m, select from the available knowledge base the families that m belongs to [1, 19, 34-36, 39, 43, 48, 50, 54-56, 58] . In this way, it is possible to associate unknown samples to already known families, and by consequence provide an added-value information for further analyses.
Malware Category Detection
Malware can be categorized according to their prominent behaviours and objectives. As an example, malicious so ware can be interested in spying on users' activities and stealing their sensitive information (i.e., spyware), encrypting documents and asking for a ransom in some cryptocurrency (i.e., ransomware), or gaining remote control of an infected machine (i.e., remote access trojans).
Even if more sophisticated malware t more behaviours and objectives, using these categories is a coarse-grained yet signi cant way of describing malicious samples [16, 18, 69, 71, 74] . Although cyber security rms have not still agreed upon a standardized taxonomy of malware categories, e ectively recognizing the categories of a sample can add valuable information for the analysis.
Malware Novelty and Similarity Detection
Along the line of acquiring knowledge about unknown samples by comparing them against known malware, it is really interesting to identify what are the speci c similarities and di erences of the binaries to analyse with respect to those already analysed and stored in the knowledge base. We can distinguish between two distinct types of novelty and similarity detection.
• similarities detection: discovering what parts and aspects of a sample are similar to something that has been already examined in the past enables to focus on what is really new, and hence to discard the rest as it does not deserve further investigation [8, 10, 23, 57, 61] . • di erences detection: as a complement, also identifying what is di erent from everything that has been observed in the past results worthwhile. As a ma er of fact, di erences can guide towards discovering novel aspects that should be analysed more in depth [10, 51, 57, 59, 61, 65] .
Malware Development Detection
An undeniable advantage for malware developers is the wide availability of the most used defence mechanisms, such as antiviruses, sandboxes, and online scanning services. Indeed, these tools can be used to test the evasion capabilities of the samples being developed. e la er can be consequently re ned to avoid being detected by speci c technologies, which can also depend on the actual targets of the a ackers. Malware analysts can leverage this practice by analysing the submissions of samples to online services, like VirusTotal and public sandboxes, in order to identify those submissions that seem related to the test of novel malware [16, 33] . In particular, by analysing submissions and their metadata, researchers found out that malicious samples involved in famous targeted a acks, have been previously submi ed to Anubis Sandbox [33] .
Malware A ribution
Another aspect malware analysts are interested in regards the identi cation of who developed a given malware [14] . Anytime a cyber threat is detected, a three-level analysis can be carried out: technical, operational, and strategic. From a technical perspective, a malware analyst looks at speci c indicators of the executable: what programming language has been used, if it contains any IP address or URL, and the language of comments and resources. Another distinctive trait, in case the malware exchanges messages with a command and control center, is the time slot where the a acker triggers the malware. e operational analysis consists in correlating technical information related to other cyber threats that share similarities with the malicious sample under analysis. During the strategic analysis, extracted technical and operational knowledge can be merged with intelligence information and political evaluations in the a empt of a ributing a (set of) malware sample(s) to a cyber threat actor or group.
Malware Triage
A last objective addresses the need to provide a fast and accurate prioritization for new samples when they come at a fast rate and have to be analysed. is process is referred to as triage, and is becoming relevant because of the growing volume of new samples developed daily. Malware triage shares some aspects with the detection of variants, novelties and similarities, since they give key information to support the prioritization process. Nevertheless, triage should be considered as a di erent objective because it requires faster execution at the cost of possible worse accuracy, hence di erent techniques are usually employed [37] .
MALWARE ANALYSIS FEATURES
is section provides an overview on the data used by reviewed papers to achieve the objectives outlined in Section 3. e features given as input to machine learning algorithms derive from these data. Since almost all the works we examined considered Windows executables, the inputs taken into account are extracted from the content of the PEs themselves or from traces and logs related to their execution.
In many cases, surveyed works only refer to macro-classes without mentioning the speci c features they employed. As an example, when n-grams are used, only a minority of works mention the size of n. Whenever possible, for each feature type we provide a table reporting what speci c features are used, with proper references.
Strings
A PE can be inspected to explicitly look for the strings it contains, such as code fragments, author signatures, le names, system resource information. ese types of strings have been shown [68] to provide valuable information for the malware analysis process (see Table 1 ). Once strings in clear are extracted, it is possible to gather information like number and presence of speci c strings, which can unveil key cues to gain additional knowledge on a PE [36, 68] . In [1] , the authors use histograms representing how string lengths are distributed in the sample. String extraction tools. Strings 1 and pedump 2 are two well-known tools for extracting strings from a PE. While pedump outputs the list of the strings found in a Windows executable, Strings allows to use wild-card expressions and tune search parameters. Conversely to Strings, pedump is able to detect most common packers, hence it can be also used when the PE is packed. Both tools fail if 1:8
Daniele Ucci, Leonardo Aniello, and Roberto Baldoni the strings contained in the executable are obfuscated. Another remarkable tool is FLOSS 3 , which combines di erent static analysis techniques to deal with obfuscated string found in analysed samples. Table 1 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type Strings
Number of strings; presence of "GetProcAddress", "CopyMemory", "CreateFileW", "OpenFile", "FindFirstFileA", "FindNextFileA", "Reg eryValueExW" [36] Distribution of string lengths [1] 
Byte sequences
A binary can be characterised by computing features on its byte-level content. Analysing the speci c sequences of bytes in a PE is a widely employed technique (see Table 2 ). A few works use chunks of bytes of speci c sizes [68, 72] , while many others rely on n-grams [1, 3, 4, 15, 19, 27, 37, 42, 50, 61, 69, 72, 75, 76, 80 ]. An n-gram is a sequence of n bytes, and features correspond to the di erent combination of these n bytes, namely each feature represents how many times a speci c combination of n bytes occurs in the binary. Di erent works use n-grams of diverse sizes. Most of them rely on sequences no longer than 3 (i.e., trigrams). Indeed, the number of features to consider grows exponentially with n. 
Opcodes
Opcodes identify the machine-level operations executed by a PE, and can be extracted by examining the assembly code [1, 3, 4, 31, 34, 40, 43, 56, 65, 66, [69] [70] [71] [72] . As shown in Table 3 , opcode frequency is a type of feature employed in some surveyed papers. It measures the number of times each speci c opcode appears within the assembly of, or it is executed by, a PE [40] . Others [4, 40] count opcode occurrences by aggregating them by operation scope, e.g., math instructions, memory access instructions. Similarly to n-grams, also sequences of opcodes are used as features [31, 40, 72] . Given the executable, the Interactive DisAssembler 4 (IDA) is the most popular commercial solution that allows the extraction of the assembly code. Table 3 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type Opcodes
Branch instruction, count, privileged instruction count, and memory instruction count [4] Math instruction count, logic instruction count, stack instruction count, NOP instruction count, and other instruction count [4, 40] Sequences of length 1 and 2 [65] Instruction frequencies [1, 40] Data de ne instruction proportions [1] Count of instructions manipulating a single-bit, data transfer instruction count, data conversion instruction count, pointer-related instruction count, compare instruction count, jump instruction count, I/O instruction count, and set byte on conditional instruction count [40] 4.4 APIs/System calls Similarly to opcodes, APIs and system calls enable the analysis of samples' behaviour, but at a higher level (see Table 4 ). ey can be extracted by analysing either the disassembly code (to get the list of all calls that can be potentially executed) or the execution traces (for the list of calls actually invoked). While APIs allow to characterise in general what actions are executed by a sample [1, 7, 23, 36, 39, 43, 49, 70 ], looking at system call invocations provides a speci c view on the interaction of the PE with the operating system [4, 6, 10, 19, 23, 24, 45, 48, 57, 58, 61, 66, 76] . Data extracted by observing APIs and system calls can be really large, and many works carry out additional processing to reduce feature space by using convenient data structures. Next subsections give an overview on the data structures used in surveyed papers. [8, 17, 51] Syscall dependencies [10, 24, 57] Syscall sequences [6, 45, 58, 76] MIST representation [61] "RegOpenKeyEx" count, "RegOpenKeyExW" count, "Reg eryValueExW" count, "Compositing" count, "MessageBoxW" count, "LoadLibraryW" count, "LoadLibrary-ExW" count, "0x54" count [36] Referred APIs count, Referred DDLs count [7] Process activity [50] Is API 'x' present in the analysed sample? [39] 4.4.1 Call graphs and data dependent call graphs. Call graphs allow to analyse how data is exchanged among procedure calls [63] by storing relationships among these procedures, and possibly including additional information on variables and parameters. Call graphs have been employed in [24, 33, 43, 45] to extract relationships among invoked functions. API call graphs have been subsequently extended in [17, 24, 58] by integrating data dependencies among APIs. Formally, two API calls are data dependent if the one invoked a erwards uses a parameter given in input to the other.
4.4.2
Control flow graphs, enriched control flow graphs, and quantitative data flow graphs. Control ow graphs allow compilers to produce an optimized version of the program itself [2] . Each graph models control ow relationships which can be used to represent the behaviour of a PE and extract the program structure. Works employing control ow graphs for sample analysis are [4, 17, 33] . In [25] , graph nodes are enriched with dynamic analysis information for deciding if conditional jumps are actually executed.Wüchner et al. [80] use quantitative data ow graphs to model the amount of data owing among system resources. Analogously, Polino et al. leverage data ow analysis in order to track data dependencies and control operations in main memory [59] .
4.4.3
Multilayer dependency chains. Represent function templates organized according sample behaviors [49] . Stored into di erent chains, function templates are characterized by six subbehaviors capturing interactions between samples and the system in which they run. In turn, each chain contains a complete sequence of API calls invoked by a sample, along with API call metadata. All these information provide analysts a more detailed characterization of malware behavior.
4.4.4
Causal dependency graphs. ey have been initially proposed by [8] for tracking the activities of a malware by monitoring persistent state changes in the target system. ese persistent state changes enable to de ne malware behaviour pro les and recognize classes of malware exhibiting similar behaviours. In [43] , causal dependency graphs are used to discover the entry point exploited by an a acker to gain access to a system.
Markov chains and Hidden Markov Models.
Markov chains are memoryless random processes evolving with time. In [3, 4, 69] , Markov chains are used to model binary content and execution traces of a sample to perform malware classi cation. Similarly to the approach designed in [25] for building enriched data ow graphs, instructions are categorized in 8 coarse-grained classes (e.g., math and logic instructions).
Hidden Markov models are probabilistic functions of Markov chains. States of hidden Markov models are unobservable, while the output of a state can be observed and it obeys to a probabilistic distribution (continuous or discrete). Pai et al. train various hidden Markov models having 2 hidden states, to recognize malware belonging to speci c families [56] .
Memory accesses
Any data of interest such as user generated content, Windows Registry key, con guration and network activity passes through main memory, hence analysing how memory is accessed can reveal important information about the behaviour of an executable [60] (see Table 5 ). Some works [43, 70] either rely on Virtual Machine Monitoring and Introspection techniques, or statically trace reads and writes in main memory. Egele et al. dynamically trace values read from and wri en to stack and heap [23] . Memory analysis tools. Di erent open-source tools are available to analyse memory during sample executions, such as Volatility 5 and Rekall 6 , both included in the SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit 7 . Table 5 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type Memory accesses
Performed read and write operations in main memory [43] Values read/wri en from/to stack and heap [23] 4.6 File system accesses What samples do with les is fundamental to grasp evidence about the interaction with the environment and possible a empts to gain persistence. Features of interest mainly concern how many les are read or modi ed, what type of les and in what directories [8, 17, 33, 43, 48, 50, 54] (see Table 6 ). Sandboxes and memory analysis toolkits include modules for monitoring interactions with the le system, usually modelled by counting the number of les created/deleted/modi ed by the PE under analysis. In [54] , the size of these les is considered as well, while Lin et al. leverage the number of created hidden les [50] .
File System analysis tools. Activities performed on le system can be monitored using programs like MS Windows Process Monitor 8 and SysAnalyzer 9 . While SysAnalyzer implements by default snapshots over a user-de ned time interval to reduce the amount of data presented to malware analysts, Process Monitor has been designed for real-time monitoring. Nevertheless, SysAnalyzer can be also used in live-logging mode. ProcDOT 10 allows the integration of Process Monitor with network traces, produced by standard network sni ers (e.g. Windump), and provides an interactive visual analytics tool to analyse the binary activity. Table 6 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type File system accesses
File system accesses Number of created/deleted/modi ed les, size of created les [54] Number of created hidden les [50] 4.7 Windows Registry e registry is one of the main sources of information for a PE about the environment, and also represents a fundamental tool to hook into the operating system, for example to gain persistence. Discovering what keys are queried, created, deleted and modi ed can shed light on many signi cant characteristics of a sample [48, 50, 54, 70] (see Table 7 ). Usually, works relying on le system inputs (see Section 4.6) monitor also the Windows Registry. In [70] , changes to le system are used in conjunction with le system accesses. Windows Registry analysis tools. Process Monitor, introduced in Section 4.6, takes also care of detecting changes to the Windows Registry. Similarly, RegShot 11 is an open-source lightweight so ware for examining variations in the Windows Registry by taking a snapshot before and a er the sample is executed. Since it is based on snapshots, malware analysts are not overwhelmed with data belonging to the entire execution of the samples. As mentioned for memory and le system accesses, usually, sandboxes monitor Windows Registry key creations/deletions/modi cations, reporting occurred changes. Table 8 ). Both [43] and [1] rely on static analysis of registers, whereas [23] and [32] employ a dynamic approach. Some works examine register use to detect malware variants [1, 32, 43] . While in [43] and [1] the objective is to identify samples belonging to one or more speci c families, [32] aims to select the variants of the malware under analysis. Static analyses of CPU registers involve counting reads and writes performed on each register [43] , tracking the number of changes to FLAGS [43] , and measuring the frequency of register usage [1] . Conversely, [32] applies dynamic analysis to get features associated to the values contained in CPU registers. Instead, [23] monitors only returned values with the objective of detecting similarities among executables. Table 8 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type CPU registers
Registers
No. of changes to FLAGS register, register read/write count [43] Returned values in the eax register upon function completion [23] Registers usage frequency [1] Registers values [32] 4.9 Function length Another characterising feature is the length of functions. In particular, the frequency of function lengths is used [17] (see Table 9 ). is input alone is not su cient to discriminate malicious executables from benign so ware, indeed it is usually employed in conjunction with other features.
is idea, formulated in [74] , is adopted in [36] , where function length frequencies are combined with other static and dynamic features. Table 9 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type Function length Function length Function length frequencies [36] Linearly/polynomially/exponentially spaced bins of length ranges [17] 4.10 PE file characteristics A static analysis of a PE can provide a large set of valuable information such as sections, imports, symbols, used compilers (see Table 10 ). As malware generally present slight di erences with respect to benign PEs, these information can be used to understand if a le is malicious or not [6, 7, 48, 81] .
Raised exceptions
e analysis of the exceptions raised during the execution can help understanding what strategies a malware adopts to evade analysis systems [6, 66] . A common trick to deceive analysts is throwing an exception to run a malicious handler, registered at the beginning of malware execution. In this way, examining the control ow becomes much more complex. is is the case of the Andromeda Section a ributes [1, 6] botnet, version 2.08 12 . Even if such version is outdated, Andromeda is still active and targets victims with spam campaigns 13 .
Network
A huge number of key information can be obtained by observing how the PE interacts with the network. Contacted addresses, generated tra c, and received packets can unveil valuable aspects, e.g., regarding communications with a command and control center. Statistics on used protocols, TCP/UDP ports, HTTP requests, DNS-level interactions are other features of this type (see Table 11 ). Many surveyed works require dynamic analysis to extract this kind of information [8, 10, 17, 33, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55] . Other papers extract network-related inputs by monitoring the network and analysing incoming and outgoing tra c [18, 44, 77] . A complementary approach consists in analysing download pa erns of network users in a monitored network [78] . It does not require sample execution and focuses on network features related to the download of a sample, such as the website from which the le has been downloaded. 14 and Malwr 15 to test the effectiveness of their samples in evading most common antiviruses. erying these online services can provide additional information useful for the analysis: submission time, how many online antiviruses classify the same as malicious, and other data on the submission (see Table 12 ). Graziano et al. [33] leverage submissions to a sandbox for identifying cases of malware development. Surprisingly, samples used in infamous targeted campaigns have been found to be submi ed to public sandboxes months or years before. [6, 33, 66] Created hidden les/registries, hidden connections, process/ le activity, frequencies of speci c words in the AV/Sandbox report [33, 50] Count of registry types and registries modi cations [33, 54] PE le characteristics, timestamps, AV labels, submi ing user information, and sandbox analysis results [33] 4.14 Code stylometry Features related to the coding style used by an anonymous malware author can reveal important details about her identity. Unfortunately, this kind of features requires the availability of source code, which is very rare in malware analysis. However, in case of leaks and/or public disclosures, source codes can become available. In [14] , the author's coding style of a generic so ware (i.e. not necessarily malicious) is captured through syntactic, lexical, and layout features (see Table 13 ). ese are extracted both from the source code and from the abstract syntax tree, representing the executable. Syntactic features model keywords and the properties of the abstract syntax tree, while lexical and layout features allow to gather information about author's code writing preferences. Table 13 . List of features employed in the surveyed papers for the input type Code stylometry
Code stylometry
Source code's lexical, layout, and syntactic properties [14] 5 MALWARE ANALYSIS ALGORITHMS In this section we brie y describe the machine learning algorithms used by reviewed papers. Di erent algorithms aim at a di erent goals, e.g., nding a match with respect to some available knowledge base, or classifying samples by assigning them labels, or clustering PEs on the basis of some metrics. We accordingly organize malware analysis algorithms in four categories: signaturebased (Section 5.1), classi cation (Section 5.2), clustering (Section 5.3), and others (Section 5.4).
Signature-based
Signature-based approaches are widely employed by commercial antiviruses to detect malicious samples. Signatures are computed by so ware analysts to nd a pa ern in potentially malicious samples under analysis. Found pa erns should be also general enough to detect variants of the same malware. Obviously this task, performed by humans, is error-prone and time-consuming [21] . Moreover, due to the generality of pa erns found by malware analysts, signature-based approaches su er from a non-negligible of false positives. However, many surveyed works propose to extract signatures from call graphs, control ow graphs, and behavior pro les.
Malicious signature matching.
Malicious signature matching approaches can be divided into two phases. First, malware signatures are collected inside a knowledge base (KB). In the second phase, signatures extracted samples to analyse are compared with those in the KB. If one or more matches are found, the consequence depends on the objective of the analysis, e.g., samples are marked as malicious, or are assigned a speci c label. Malicious signature matching has been used both for malware detection in [27] and malware variants selection in [45] and [70] .
Malicious graph matching.
Signatures can be also computed from the graphs representing speci c features or behaviours of the sample under analysis. Similarly to malicious signature matching, these approaches need an initial phase where graph representations are extracted from a dataset of samples and stored in the KB. e matching procedure, instead, varies from work to work. As an example, while in [24] signatures are extracted from data dependent call graphs (see Section 4.4.1) transformed into strings, Park et al. measure the similarity among data dependent graphs by calculating the maximal common subgraph distance [58] . Similarly to Park et al., [45] represent samples behaviour with graphs as well and matching is performed by XORing matrix representations of behavioural graphs. Malicious graph matching is applied also in [70] to generate evasion-resistant signatures.
Classification
Classi cation is the task of assigning an observation to a speci c category and it is performed through a statistical model called classi er. A classi er takes as input a vector of features representing measurable properties of an observation. In the following, several classi er implementations are discussed.
Rule-based classifier.
Rule-based classi cation relies on a set of conditions consisting in a series of tests that, if successfully passed, allow the classi er to label the instances accordingly. ese tests can be connected by logical conjunctions or more general logical expressions [79] , as in [68] and [27] . Conditions can be also applied for modelling similarity [32, 49, 69] and distance thresholds exceeding [74] , as well as scores. To this end, Lindorfer et al. use a rule-base classi er to compute the probability that a sample implements evasion techniques [51] .
Bayes
Classifier. Bayesian models are usually employed for document classi cation. Given a document and a xed set of classes, Bayesian models outputs the predicted class of the document in input. Bayesian models perform best when features are completely independent, boolean, and not redundant. e more the redundant features, the more the classi cation is biased towards such features. Many surveyed works apply Bayesian models to malware analysis [39, 65, 66, 76, 80] .
Naïve Bayes. e naïve Bayes classi er is the simplest among the probabilistic Bayes models. It assumes strong independence among features and normal distribution on feature values. While the rst assumption can be modi ed by using other probability distributions (e.g. Bernoulli), the la er needs to hold to avoid compromising classi cation results. [28, 39, 42, 68, 69, 76, 80] employ Naïve Bayes for analysing malware.
Bayesian Network. Conversely to naïve Bayes classi ers, Bayesian networks provide a tool for graphically representing probability distributions in a concise way [79] . Bayesian networks can be drawn as directed acyclic graphs, where nodes represent features and categories, while edges describe conditional dependence between nodes. Nodes are data structures storing a probability distribution over represented feature values. ese probabilistic graphical models have been used in [25, 65, 66] .
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
. Support vector machines are binary classi ers employed in a wide range of application elds ranging from control theory, medicine, biology, pa ern recognition, and information security. In malware analysis, support vector machines have been applied in a large number of surveyed papers [1, 3, 16, 18, 27, 28, 36, 39, 42-44, 50, 54, 65, 66, 69, 76, 80] . In [23] , SVM is employed to compute the optimal weights to associate to used features. ese classi ers are able to deal with high-dimensional and sparse data [44] . In order to work with non-linearly separable data, support vector machines rely on kernel methods. Support vector machines are usually bundled with three default kernel functions: polynomial, sigmoid, and radial basis function.
Multiple Kernel
Learning. Instead of using a single kernel, multiple kernel learning combines di erent kernel functions to classify observations. Chosen kernels may either capture complementary aspects of observations under analysis or aggregate features coming from di erent sources [30] . In [4] , Anderson et al. combine six kernels, each one corresponding to a di erent data source (e.g. PE le information, system calls), and leverage multiple kernel learning for detecting malicious samples.
5.2.5
Prototype-based Classification. is approach relies on the concept of prototypes. ey correspond to malware activity reports output by sandboxes or obtained by emulators, virtual or physical machines provided with monitoring tools. In [61] , malware activity is extracted by means of system calls and by converting them in feature vectors. As discussed in Section 4.4, system calls are representative of samples behaviour. A prototype combines all the feature vectors in groups of homogeneous behaviours, according to the available reports. In the same work, Rieck et al.
propose an approximation algorithm for extracting prototypes from a dataset of malware activity reports. Classi cation is performed by extracting the prototype from the sample under analysis and computing its nearest prototype in the dataset. e distance between prototypes is measured by using the Euclidean distance.
Decision
Tree. Decision tree classi ers are widely employed in many elds. In general, nodes are meant for testing input features against some learned threshold [79] . One of the main strength of decision trees is that they can be trained using boolean, numeric, or nominal features. During the test phase, feature values guide the path to follow along the tree until a leaf node is reached. e speci c instance is classi ed according to the category assigned to such leaf. In malware analysis, observations are typically related to samples. Works using decision trees are [7, 28, 36, 39, 40, 42, 54, 55, 65, 66, 71, 72, 76] . Interestingly, decision trees can be reduced to rule-based classi ers (see 5.2.1). Indeed, every path in the tree leading to a leaf node can be represented as a set of rules logically in "AND".
Random Forest. ese classi ers are ensembles of decision trees, each fed with feature values independently sampled using the same distribution for all trees [13] . Usually classi er ensembles are obtained by means of bagging, boosting, and randomization. Random forest uses bagging since it introduces randomness in the choice of the features to take into account. Random forest classi ers have been applied in [1, 18, 36, 39, 40, 71, 76, 80] .
Gradient Boosting Decision Tree. Conversely to random forest classi ers, gradient boosting decision trees are tree ensembles built by using the boosting technique. ey aim to minimize the expected value of a speci ed loss function on a training set. In [16] and [69] , gradient boosting decision trees are used to detect the category of malicious samples.
Logistic Model Tree. Logistic model tree classi ers are decision trees having logistic regression models at their leaves. ese models are linear and built on independent variables, representing the considered classes, weighted on the basis of the samples in the training set. Weights are computed by maximizing the log-likelihood. Graziano et al. employ logistic model trees for analysing malware submi ed to a public sandbox [33] , whereas [19, 57, 69] leverage logistic regression classi ers to detect, respectively, families of malware, their categories, and novelties or similarities with respect to other samples.
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN).
For each labeled d-length feature vector contained in a training set of size n, a k-NN algorithm transforms them in d-dimensional points. Labels can, for example, report if a sample is malicious or benign. In the test phase, given a m-size dataset of samples under analysis, these are transformed into d-dimensional points to nd what are their k nearest neighbours by means of a distance or similarity measure (e.g., Euclidean distance). Categories of unknown instances are chosen by picking the most popular class among them. e main advantage of these classi ers is that they require short training times. Using a worst-case analysis model, the time required to train a k-Nearest Neighbor classi er is Θ (n · d). e test phase has Θ (m · n · d) time complexity [52] . Classic implementations of k-Nearest Neighbor can be further re ned to improve their running time to logarithmic by employing KD-tree data structures.
Artificial Neural
Network. Neural networks are computing systems formed by a set of highly interconnected processing units organized in layers. Each processing unit has an activation function and is linked to other units by means of weighted connections that are modi ed according to a speci ed learning rule. Arti cial neural networks are widely employed in pa ern recognition and novelty detection, time series prediction, and in medical diagnoses. ey perform best if the system they model is error-tolerant and can be helpful when the relationships among inputs are not clear or di cult to describe with other models. Limitations strongly depend on the used activation function and applied learning rule. Dahl et al. take advantage of neural networks for detecting malware families, with unsatisfactory results [19] .
Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network. Multilayer Perceptrons are neural networks whose connections are acyclic and each layer is fully connected with the next one. For this reason, they can be represented through directed graphs. ese classi ers employ non-linear activation functions and, in the training phase, use backpropagation. In [28] , Multilayer Perceptron Neural Networks are used for detecting malware.
Clustering
Clustering is the process of grouping similar elements. e ideal clustering should arrange similar elements together and they should be distant from other groups, also called clusters. e notion of distance is de ned according speci c distance or similarity metrics. Clustering methods can be divided into hierarchical, partitioning, so -computing, density-based, and model-based [62] .
Clustering with locality sensitive hashing.
Local sensitive hashing is a dimensionality reduction technique for approximating clusters and neighbor search. It relies on locality-sensitive hash families, which map elements into bins. Similar elements are more likely to be mapped to same bucket. Locality-sensitive hash families and, hence local sensitive hashing, are de ned only for speci c similarity and distance measures such as cosine or Jaccard similarity and Hamming or Euclidean distance. Local sensitive hashing is the building block for grouping similar malicious sample and it has been applied in some works [10, 73, 75] .
5.3.2
Clustering with Distance and Similarity Metrics. As already discussed, clustering can be performed by taking into account either distance or similarity among di erent samples. Several metrics have been used in malware analysis: Euclidean [54, 61] and Hamming distances [54] , cosine [54] and Jaccard similarities [54, 59] . Distances can be also computed on signatures extracted by samples using tools such as ssdeep 16 and sdhash 17 . Both are fuzzy hashing algorithms based on blocks: anytime a su cient amount of input is processed, a small block is generated. Each of the generated blocks is a portion of the nal signature. Samples can be grouped together, in conjunction with other features, on the basis of their signatures obtained with block-based fuzzy hashing, as in [33] and [75] .
Time complexity of algorithms based on distances and similarity metrics depends both on the used measures and their implementations. For commonly applied metrics, such as cosine similarity, Euclidean and Hamming distances, the required time to compute them between two d-dimensional points is O (d). us, given a dataset of m samples, the time complexity to cluster them on these metrics is O d · m 2 .
k-Means
Clustering. k-means is one of the simplest and most used clustering algorithm [62] . It is a variant of the Expectation Maximization algorithm, belongs to the class of partition algorithms and separates data into k clusters. e number of clusters k is chosen a priori and initial cluster centers, called centroids, are picked randomly. Iteratively, each instance of the dataset is assigned to its nearest centroid to minimize the least within-cluster sum of squares, that is the squared Euclidean distance. k-means can halt in two cases: the sum of squared error is under a threshold τ or no change occurs for the k clusters. is guarantees to reach a local optimum and convergence in a nite number of iterations. Even if theoretically has been proven that in the worst case k-means has an exponential running time, a relatively recent smoothed analysis has shown that the number of iterations are bounded by a polynomial in the number n of data points [5] . However, in practice, k-means running time is o en linear in n. Both Huang et al. and Pai et al. use k-means clustering for performing family selection as objective of their analyses [35, 56] .
Density-based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise. DBSCAN is a widely known density-based clustering algorithm, initially proposed by Ester et al. for grouping objects in large databases [26] . It is able to e ciently compute clusters of arbitrary shape through a two step process. e rst step involves the selection of an entry having in its neighbourhood at least a certain number of other entries (i.e., the core point). Its neighbours can be obtained by transforming the database into a collection of points and by then measuring the distance among them. If the distance is lower than a chosen threshold, then the two points are considered neighbours. In the second step, the cluster is built by grouping all the points that are density-reachable from the core point.
e notion of density-reachability has been de ned in [26] , and regards the constraints that allow a point to be directly reachable from another. e conditions impose that the former is a core point and the la er is in its neighbourhood. Rather than referring to two single points, density-reachability applies to a path in which points are directly reachable from each other. e algorithm runs on a database storing n entries that can be transformed in n points, and mainly serves neighbourhood queries. ese queries can be answered e ciently in O(log n) (e.g. by using R * -trees), thus the expected running time of DBSCAN is O(n log n). Vadrevu et al. use DBSCAN to detect variants of malware [77] .
Hierarchical Clustering.
A hierarchical clustering schema recursively partitions instances and constructs a tree of clusters called dendrogram. e tree structure allows the cluster exploration at di erent levels of granularity. Hierarchical clustering can be performed in two ways: agglomerative and divisive. Agglomerative approaches are bo om-up: they start with clusters each having a single element, then closer cluster pairs are iteratively merged until a unique cluster contains all the elements. Divisive approaches are top-down: all the elements are initially included in a unique cluster, then they are divided in smaller sub-clusters until clusters with only one element are obtained.
Closeness can be modelled using di erent criteria: complete-link, single-link, average-link, centroid-link, and Ward's-link [38, 54] . Agglomerative clustering is more used than divisive, mainly because in the worst case it has a running time O(n 2 log n), while divisive approach is exponential. In malware analysis, hierarchical clustering has been applied in [37, 54] .
5.3.6
Prototype-based Clustering. Analogously to what described in Section 5.2.5, prototypes can be also used to cluster malware that are similar among each other [61] . In [61] , Rieck et al. leverage hierarchical complete linkage clustering technique to group reports (see Section 5.2.5 for prototype/report mapping). e algorithm running time is O(k 2 log k + n), where k and n are the number of prototypes and reports, respectively. us, prototype-based clustering provides a (n/k) 1 2 time complexity with respect to exact hierarchical clustering running time.
5.3.7 Self-Organizing Maps. Self-organizing maps are useful data explorations tools that can be also used to cluster data.
ey are applied to a vast range of application elds going from industry, nance, natural sciences, to linguistics [41] . Self-organizing maps can be represented as an ordered regular grid in which more similar models are automatically arranged together in adjacent positions on the grid, far away from less similar models. Model disposition allows to get additional information from the data topographic relationships. is capability is fundamental when dealing with high-dimensional data. In a rst phase, self-organizing maps are calibrated using an input dataset. en, each time a new input instance feeds the map, it is elaborated by the best-matching model. Analogously to what described in Section 5.3.2, a model best-matches an instance on the basis of a speci c similarity or distance measure. Many proposed self-organizing maps rely on di erent similarity or distance measures (e.g., dot product, Euclidean and Minkowski distances). Self-organizing maps have been used in [16] for analysing malware.
Others
is subsection presents Machine Learning algorithms that are neither signature-based, nor classication, nor clustering.
Expectation Maximization.
Expectation-maximization is a general-purpose statistical iterative method of maximum likelihood estimation used in cases where observations are incomplete. It is o en applied also for clustering. Given a set of observations characterizing each element of the dataset, an expectation step assigns the element to the most likely cluster, whereas a maximization step recomputes centroids. e main strengths of expectation-maximization are stability, robustness to noise, and ability to deal with missing data. Finally, the algorithm has been proven to converge to a local maximum. Expectation maximization has been employed by Pai et al. for detecting malware variants belonging to the same families [56] .
5.4.2
Learning with Local and Global Consistency. Learning with local and global consistency is a semi-supervised approach. Information on known labels are spread to neighbours until a global stable state is reached [82] . Learning with local and global consistency has been proved e ective on synthetic data, in digit recognition and text categorization [82] . In malware analysis, this learning approach has been applied with good, but not excellent, results in [67] .
Belief Propagation.
Belief propagation is an approach for performing inference over graphical models (e.g. Bayesian networks) and, in general, graphs. It works iteratively. At each iteration, each pair of inter-connected nodes exchanges messages reporting nodes opinions about their probabilities of being in a certain state. Belief propagation converges when probabilities do not keep changing signi cantly or a er a xed number of iterations. Both [73] and [15] adapt belief propagation to malware analysis by proposing new mathematical representations. In [15] , Chen et al. properly tune belief propagation algorithm and improve it with respect to the approach used in [73] and other classi cation algorithms (e.g., support vector machines and decision trees).
CHARACTERIZATION OF SURVEYED PAPERS
In this section we leverage on the discussed objectives (Section 3), feature classes (Section 4) and algorithm types (Section 5) to precisely characterize each reviewed paper. Such characterization is organized by objective: for each objective, we provide an overall view about which works aims at that objective, what machine learning algorithm they use and what feature classes they rely on. Table 14 lists all the reviewed works having malware detection as objective. It can be noted that the most used inputs regard • byte sequences, extracted from either the PE or its disassembled code, and organized in n-grams • API/system call invocations, derived by executing the samples Most of the works use more algorithms to nd out the one guaranteeing more accurate results.
Malware detection

Malware variants detection
As explained in Section 3.2, variants detection includes two slightly diverse objectives: given a malware, identifying either its variants or its families. Tables 15 and Table 16 detail surveyed works aiming to identify variants and families, respectively. In both characterizations, APIs and system calls are largely employed as well as their interactions with the environment, modeled by memory, le system, Windows registries, and CPU registers. Some of the surveyed papers, instead, use byte sequences and opcodes, while others add to the analysis features related to sample network activity.
Malware category detection
ese articles focus on the identi cation of speci c threats and, thus, on particular inputs such as byte sequences, opcodes, executable binaries' function lengths, and network activity regarding samples. Table 17 reports the works whose objectives deal with the detection of the speci c category of a malware sample. Tian et al. [74] Rule-based classi er Siddiqui et al. [71] Decision Tree, Random Forest Chen et al. [16] Random Forest, SVM Comar et al. [18] Random Forest, SVM Sexton et al. [69] Rule-based classi er, Logistic Regression, Naïve Bayes, SVM Table 19 . Characterization of surveyed papers having malware di erences detection as objective.
Malware novelty and similarity detection
Similarly to Section 6.2, this characterization groups works whose objective is to spot (dis)similarities among samples. According to the nal objective of the analysis, one can be more interested in nding out either similarities or di erences characterizing a group of samples. All the analysed papers but [65] rely on APIs and system call collection (see Table 18 and Table 19 ). While works aiming to spo ing di erences among PEs, in general, do not take into account interactions with the system in which they are executed, the ones that identify similarities leverage such information. Table 20 outlines the very few works that propose approaches to deal with malware development cases. While Chen et al. use just byte sequences for their analysis [16] , in [33] , both information related to malicious sample execution into a sandbox and their submission-related metadata are used.
Malware development detection
Paper
Algorithms Byte seq.
APIs
Sys. calls
File sys.
Win. Reg.
Net. Submissions
Chen et al. [16] Gradient Boosting Decision Tree, Self-Organizing Maps, SVM Graziano et al. [33] Logistic Model Tree, Clustering using ssdeep tool Table 20 . Characterization of surveyed papers having malware development detection as objective.
Malware a ribution
Malware a ribution is one of the most important tasks at the strategic level (see Section 3.6). e U.S. government has allocated research funds for the next decade to be able to a ribute cyber threats to speci c actors or groups, active in the cyberwarfare. In addition to the typical inputs used in malware analysis, Caliskan-Islam et al. rely on code stylometry [14] (refer to Table 21 ).
Paper Algorithms Code stylometry
Caliskan-Islam et al. [14] Random Forest Table 21 . Characterization of surveyed papers having malware a ribution as objective.
Malware triage
Even if serious a ention has been paid on malware detection in general, much less consideration is given to malware triage, as shown in Table 22 . Jang et al. are the only ones, among the surveyed Paper Algorithms Byte seq.
APIs
Sys. calls
Jang et al. [37] Clustering with locality sensitive hashing, full hierarchical clustering Table 22 . Characterization of surveyed papers having malware triage as objective. works, that perform triage by using PE's byte sequences and API/system call invocations [37] .
DATASETS
In the vast majority of surveyed works, datasets contain both malicious and benign samples. Nevertheless, several papers perform their experimental evaluations using datasets having solely malicious executables. e objectives of these works are variants and families selection [1, 34, 35, 43, 48, 49, 54, 55, 70, 75, 77] , category detection [74] , malware novelty and similarity detection [8, 10, 51, 61] . Just two works rely on benign datasets only [14, 23] . Since their objectives are identifying sample similarities and a ributing the ownership of some source codes under analysis, respectively, then they do not necessarily need malware. Figure 1 reports a summary of the employed sources for malicious and benign samples, respectively. Used datasets come from legitimate applications, public repositories, security vendors, sandboxes, AV companies and research centers, Internet Service Providers, honeypots, CERT and, in some cases, datasets are built by the researchers themselves.
It is worth noting that most of the benign datasets consist of legitimate applications, while most of malware have been obtained from public repositories, security vendors and popular sandboxed analysis services. Legitimate applications include PEs contained in the "Program Files" or "system" folders, and downloads from "trusted" (i.e. signed) companies. Examples of these benign programs are Cygwin, Pu y, the Microso O ce Suite, and Adobe Acrobat. e most popular public repository in the examined works is VX Heavens 21 , followed by O ensive Computing 22 and Malicia Project 23 . e rst two repositories are still actively maintained at the time of writing, while Malicia Project has been permanently shut down due to dataset aging and lack of maintainers. Security vendors, popular sandboxed analysis services, and AV companies have access to a huge number of samples. Surveyed works rely on CWSandbox and Anubis sandboxed analysis services. CWSandbox is a commercial sandbox, now named reat Analyzer. It is actively developed by reatTrack Security 24 . Anubis is no more maintained 25 by their creators and by iSecLab 26 , which was the international laboratory hosting the sandbox. As can be observed from Figure 1 An interesting case is represented by samples developed by the researchers themselves. A few works use in their evaluations malicious samples developed by the authors [31, 40, 70] . ese samples are created by also using malware toolkits such as Next Generation Virus Constrution Kit 27 , Virus Creation Lab 28 , Mass Code Generator 29 , and Second Generation Virus Generator 30 . Finally, a minority of analysed papers do not mention the source of their datasets.
One of the most common problems of these datasets is that, very o en, they are not balanced. A proper training of machine learning models require that each class contains an almost equal amount of samples, otherwise inaccurate models could be obtained. e same problem holds when also benign datasets are used, indeed malicious samples should be roughly as many as benign samples. In [81] , Yonts supports his choice of using a smaller benign dataset by pointing out that changes in standard system les and legitimate applications are li le. However, there are surveyed works that rely on benign datasets whose size is bigger than the size of malicious ones [12, 15, 40, 42, 69, 71, 73, 76] .
Samples contained in the datasets used in considered papers are already labeled in general. Figure 2 reports statistics on whether considered works perform further labeling on these samples. e majority of reviewed papers does not perform any additional labeling operation to their already-labeled datasets. However, some works analyse samples again and recompute labels to check if they match with the ones provided together with the datasets. Label computation can be manual, automated, or both. Manual labeling is a highly time-consuming task, but provides more accurate results since this activity is usually performed by security experts. Consequently, the number of samples that can be labeled using this method is quite small compared to automated labeling techniques. Few works use manual labeling [19, 33, 59, 75] , while others combine manual and automated methods [10, 34, 51, 54] .
Di erently from other research elds, in malware analysis there are no available reference benchmarks to compare accuracy and performance with respect to previous works. In addition, since the datasets used for experimental evaluations are rarely shared, it is di cult, if not impossible, to compare works. In the papers we have surveyed, only two works have shared the dataset used in their evaluations [68, 75] , while a third one plans to provide a reference to the analysed malware samples in the future [54] . To this end, Upchurch et al. [75] share a golden standard test dataset for future works that aim to perform malware variants selection analyses. e dataset is imbalanced and only includes 85 samples, organized in 8 families containing trojans, information stealers, bots, keyloggers, backdoors, and potentially unwanted programs. All the above samples have been analysed by professional malware analysts and tested against 5 di erent malware variant detection approaches. Experimental evaluations report performance and accuracy of tested methodologies and compare obtained results with the ones published in the original papers. Sample metadata include MD5 hashes, but no temporal information, i.e., when a sample appeared rst. Miller et al. have extensively proved that the lack of this critical information considerably a ects the accuracy of experimental results [53] . 27 Next Generation Virus Construktion Kit: h p://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=tn02 28 Virus Creation Lab: h p://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=tv03 29 Mass Code Generator: h p://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=tm02 30 Second Generation Virus Generator: h p://vxheaven.org/vx.php?id=tg00
Given such lack of reference datasets, we propose three desiderata for malware analysis benchmarks.
(1) Benchmarks should be labeled accordingly to the speci c objectives to achieve. As an example, benchmarks for families selection should be labeled with samples' families, while benchmarks for category detection should label malware with their categories. to keep pace with the malware industry. Samples should also be provided with temporal information, e.g., when they have been spo ed rst. In this way analysts would have at disposal a sort of timeline of malware evolution and they could also discard obsolete samples.
MALWARE ANALYSIS ECONOMICS
Analysing samples through machine learning techniques requires complex computations, both for extracting desired features and for running chosen algorithms. e time complexity of these computations has to be carefully taken into account because of the need to complete them fast enough to keep pace with the speed new malware are developed. Space complexity has to be considered as well, indeed feature space can easily become excessively large (e.g., using n-grams), and also the memory required by machine learning algorithms can grow to the point of saturating available resources. Time and space complexities can be either reduced to adapt to processing and storage capacity at disposal, or they can be accommodated by supplying more resources. In the former case, the accuracy of the analysis is likely to worsen, while in the la er accuracy levels can be kept at the cost of providing additional means, e.g., in terms of computing machines, storage, network. ere exist tradeo s between maintaining high accuracy and performance of malware analysis on one hand, and supplying the required equipment on the other.
We refer to the study of these tradeo s as malware analysis economics, and in this section we provide some initial qualitative discussions on this novel topic. e time needed to analyse a sample through machine learning is mainly spent in feature extraction and algorithm execution. ere exist in literature plenty of works discussing time complexity of machine learning algorithms. e same does not apply for the study of the execution time of the feature extraction process. e main aspect to take into account in such study is whether desired features come from static or dynamic analysis, which considerably a ects execution time because the former does not require to run the samples, while the la er does. Table 23 categorizes surveyed works on the basis of the type of analysis they carry out, i.e., static, dynamic or hybrid. e majority of works relies on dynamic analyses, while the others use, in equal proportions, either static analyses alone or a combination of static and dynamic techniques. To deepen even further this point, Table 24 reports for each feature type whether it can be extracted through static or dynamic analysis. It is interesting to note that certain types of features can be extracted both statically and dynamically, with signi cant di erences on execution time as well as on malware analysis accuracy. Indeed, while certainly more time-consuming, dynamic analysis enables to gather features that make the overall analysis improve its e ectiveness [20] . As an example, we can consider the features derived from API calls (see Table 24 ), which can be obtained both statically and dynamically. Tools like IDA provide the list of imports used by a sample and can statically trace what API calls are present in the sample code. Malware authors usually hide their suspicious API calls by inserting in the source code a huge number of legitimate APIs. By means of dynamic analysis, it is possible to obtain the list of the APIs that the sample has actually invoked, thus simplifying the identi cation of those suspicious APIs. By consequences, in this case dynamic analysis is likely to generate more valuable features compared to static analysis.
Although choosing dynamic analysis over, or in addition to, static seems obvious, its inherently higher time complexity constitutes a potential performance bo leneck for the whole malware analysis process, which can undermine the possibility to keep pace with malware evolution speed. e natural solution is to provision more computational resources to parallelise analysis tasks and thus remove bo lenecks. In turn, such solution has a cost to be taken into account when designing a malware analysis environment, such as the one presented by Laurenza et al. [46] . e qualitative tradeo s we have identi ed are between accuracy and time complexity (i.e., higher accuracy requires larger times), between time complexity and analysis pace (i.e., larger times implies slower pace), between analysis pace and computational resources (faster analysis demands using more resources), and between computational resources and economic cost (obviously, additional equipment has a cost). Similar tradeo s also hold for space complexity. As an example, when using n-grams as features, it has been shown that larger values of n lead to more accurate analysis, at cost of having the feature space grow exponentially with n. As another example, using larger datasets in general enables more accurate machine learning models and thus be er accuracy, provided the availability of enough space to store all the samples of the dataset and the related analysis reports. We claim the signi cance of investigating these tradeo s more in details, with the aim of outlining proper guidelines and strategies to design a malware analysis environment in compliance with requirements on analysis accuracy and pace, and also by respecting budget constraints.
CONCLUSION
We presented a survey on existing literature on malware analysis through machine learning techniques. ere are three main contributions of our work. First, we proposed an organization of reviewed works according to three orthogonal dimensions: the objective of the analysis, the type of features extracted from samples, the machine learning algorithms used to process these features. We identi ed 7 di erent malware analysis objectives (ranging from malware detection to malware triage), grouped features according to their speci c type (e.g., strings and byte sequences), and organized machine learning algorithms for malware analysis in 4 distinct classes. Such characterization provides an overview on how machine learning algorithms can be employed in malware analysis, emphasising which speci c feature classes allow to achieve the objective(s) of interest. In this rst contribution, we discussed the general lack of justi cations for using a speci c set of features to properly describe the malicious traits of samples: the majority of reviewed papers did not explain the correlation between considered features and obtained results.
Second, we highlighted some issues regarding the datasets used in literature and outlined three desiderata for building enhanced datasets. Currently, there is a shortage of publicly available datasets suitable for speci c objectives. For example, datasets where samples are properly labelled by family are a rarity. Furthermore, usually, datasets employed in reviewed experimental evaluations are rarely shared. In the majority of examined papers, used datasets are not balanced, hence preventing the construction of really accurate models. When malware samples are to be used for evaluating novel analysis techniques, their fast obsolescence becomes an additional and relevant issue. Indeed, the e ectiveness of new approaches should be tested on samples as much recent as possible, otherwise there would be the risk that such approaches turn out to be poorly accurate when applied in the real world. At today's malware evolution pace, samples are likely to become outdated in a few months, but reference datasets commonly include malware of a few years ago. us, we proposed three desired characteristics for malware analysis benchmarks: they should be (i) labeled accordingly to the speci c objectives to achieve, (ii) balanced, (iii) actively maintained and updated over time.
ird, we introduced the novel concept of malware analysis economics, concerning the investigation and exploitation of existing tradeo s between performance metrics of malware analysis (e.g., analysis accuracy and execution time) and economical costs. We have identi ed tradeo s between accuracy, time complexity, analysis pace with respect to malware evolution, required computational resources, and economic cost. Similar tradeo s also hold for space complexity.
Noteworthy research directions to investigate can be linked to each of the three contributions. e organization of malware analysis works along three dimensions can be further re ned by be er identifying and characterizing analysis objectives, extracted features, and used machine learning algorithms. Novel combinations of objectives, features and algorithms can be investigated to achieve be er performance compared to the state of the art. Moreover, observing that some classes of algorithms have never been used for a certain objective may suggest novel directions to examine further. e discussion on malware analysis datasets can drive academic works aimed at building new datasets in accordance with the three identi ed desiderata. Providing be er datasets would enable be er and fairer comparisons among results claimed by diverse works, hence would ease e ective progresses in the malware analysis eld. Finally, the initial set of general tradeo s described in the context of malware analysis economics can be deepened to derive quantitative relationships among the key metrics of interest, which would allow de ning e ective approaches to design and setup analysis environments.
